

Jur 1967

Mr. President:

I have added one sentence at the end of the first paragraph, in an effort to set a tone of hope and to give a slightly broader focus to your own view of the Middle East. It doesn't commit anyone to anything and I think there will be a favorable response to the notion of looking ahead and not back.

McG. B.

66

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1967, 6:10 PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

With a number of Dean Rusk's staff present, you may not wish to discuss organizational assignments for the special committee's work in this meeting, but on the other hand most of these are not really controversial and the sooner we start, the better off we will be.

I have in mind such assignments as the following:

1. Intelligence requirements - Mr. Helms with such assistance as he selects.
2. Security (arms supply, disarmament and arms agreements, and the like). Mr. McNamara, General Wheeler, Mr. Helms and representatives from ACDA and State. (McNamara and I would probably recommend his General Counsel, Paul Warnke, as the working agent on this committee.)
3. Political developments. The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and such subordinates as they designate.
4. Economic developments -- especially oil and money. There is general agreement here on a three-man group: Solomon for State; Demming for the Treasury; and Bator for the White House.
5. Information coordination. I think I may have to do this myself at first, with Marks, McCloskey, Christian and perhaps a senior substantive man from State. *or Phillip*

The main business in my mind this afternoon is the immediate political situation in the UN and vis à vis the Soviet Union. I think we have a real need to be on the alert for a Soviet effort to regain prestige by threats. We will want to listen to the State Department briefing on these issues.

The other more general question for discussion has to do with our own initial sense of the political meaning of the crisis and our objectives as we move beyond it. I can sketch some points here and so can McNamara, although only in the most preliminary way.

L. B.
McG. B.

June 7, 1967

EXECUTIVE

7611-5

ND19/601-6

63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George Christian

I have backgrounded hard during the afternoon on Mac *George* Bundy's role, stressing that this is a full-time, though temporary assignment made necessary by the continuing crisis and the efforts to build a new peace.

There is a definite ripple of speculation that Bundy was brought in to save the situation, that Rostow is Jewish and can't be effective in this, etc. I think we are going to get a number of stories exploring some of these angles.

I have emphasized that the situation like this, it is necessary to coordinate programs in the White House, and that it requires full-time attention.

I have talked with Bob Thompson, Carroll Kilpatrick, Chuck Bailey, Ted Kaapp, Stuart Loory, Jim Deakin, and Max Frankel. I talked to Hugh Sidey this morning about the President's attitude, demeanor, etc. during the crisis. I told him the President had been calm, cautious, and determined to work out a settlement.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 7, 1967

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OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

STATEMENT OF GEORGE CHRISTIAN
AND INTERVIEW OF MC GEORGE BUNDY
ENTRANCE TO WEST LOBBY

AT 1:37 P.M. EDT

MR. CHRISTIAN: The President met today with the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room here at the White House.

He made a statement to the Council which I shall read and paraphrase.

"The United Nations Security Council has called for a cease-fire in the Middle East. This first clear step toward lasting peace has the strongest support of our government. We have worked as hard as we could to avoid hostilities and to end them. But the fighting came, and the road forward to real peace and progress will not be easy. Still there is now a real chance for all to turn from the frustrations of the past to the hopes of a peaceful future. While the first responsibility falls to the peoples and governments in the area, we must do our best to that end, both inside and outside the United Nations.

"The continuing crisis and the effort to help build a new peace will require the most careful coordination of the work of our government. To ensure this coordination I am today establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council. The Secretary of State will preside over this Committee, and its members will be the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Wheeler), the Director of the CIA (Mr. Helms), the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Mr. Clark Clifford), and Mr. Walt Rostow (the President's Special Assistant.) I shall meet with the Committee from time to time as necessary, and so will the Vice President and the Ambassador to the United Nations."

That was the President's statement this morning. The President has asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to serve as a Special Consultant to the President and to be Executive Secretary of the Committee. Mr. Bundy has worked with the President before, and he has been in informal consultation during this past year on a number of subjects. Mr. Bundy has now asked his Board of Trustees at the Ford Foundation for a temporary leave of absence. He is already at work at the White House. The President has asked all the agencies of the government to assist Mr. Bundy with such staff support as he may request for the Special Committee. The Committee will meet regularly at the White House.

Mr. Bundy is here with me and will take a few questions, if you would like.

MORE

(OVER)

Q Mr. Bundy, could you tell us what is the scope of your work? This will be long-range planning, I presume.

MR. BUNDY: I don't want to go beyond the President's own description. The work of the committee is obviously just beginning, although the general work of the Government -- in a number of ways -- has obviously gone forward very intensively throughout the period of this crisis.

Q Mr. Bundy, will you compare this to the Special Committee that President Kennedy set up in the Cuban Missile Crisis?

MR. BUNDY: The two situations are not identical.

Like that committee -- and like others that have been set up from time to time over the last six or seven years -- to my knowledge, this one is designed to deal with the particular set of problems -- obviously a very varied and complex set of problems -- which have been brought to a point of crisis in the Middle East in recent weeks.

Q What do you see as your first priority, your first job?

MR. BUNDY: I am the Executive Secretary of a committee of Cabinet Officers, which will, undoubtedly, make clear to me what those priorities are as we go about our work.

Q Mr. Bundy, is the idea of this committee to stop the war and get the crisis settled, or is it to solve the long-term problems of the Middle East?

MR. BUNDY: I don't think I can go beyond the President's own statement on that point.

Q He doesn't explain.

MR. BUNDY: We are just at the beginning of our work and I think it's important not to try to explain our solutions, answers, or labors before we have begun them.

Q Mr. Bundy, will you evaluate this crisis in terms of the security of this country right now?

MR. BUNDY: No, I think it would not be useful for me to engage in evaluations. I am down here on a temporary basis as a staff officer, which is something I have done before. There really isn't much I can add to that.

Q Mr. Bundy, are you thinking in terms of weeks or months?

MR. BUNDY: I don't have any clear prospects on that.

Q What were you told about why the normal machinery of the NSC was not best?

MORE

MR. BUNDY: Well, I don't think this is -- in that sense -- abnormal machinery. I think it is really quite normal when you have a special situation to try to devise the appropriate special means for dealing with it.

My own impression is that we do now face the kind of situation which the President's statement describes. I have been here informally in the last two or three days, since Monday morning.

And it is very plain when you have a set of explosive events like these, they create situations which are not the same as those that he had to deal with before and you have a need to address yourself, as a Government, to the problems of the future -- as I think the President's statement says.

Q Mr. Bundy, will you have any kind of staff of your own working on problems?

MR. BUNDY: There is always the question of a few people to keep the messages straight and to keep in touch with other parts of the Government -- and that kind of thing.

But we certainly don't plan anything very elaborate. I am expecting to occupy a small group of offices in the Executive Office Building.

Q Mr. Bundy, do you foresee your effort as more in a long-range category than an immediate category? We couldn't hear back here.

MR. BUNDY: I think that is the third time we have had that question and I have said I think the President's statement has said what I would say on the subject.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

1:45 P.M. EDT

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS
OF THE UNITED STATES


Lyndon B. Johnson

*Containing the Public Messages, Speeches, and
Statements of the President*

1967

(IN TWO BOOKS)

BOOK I—JANUARY 1 TO JUNE 30, 1967



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 1968

255 Statement by the President Upon Establishing the National Security Council Special Committee on the Middle East.

June 7, 1967

THE United Nations Security Council has called for a cease-fire in the Middle East. This first clear step toward lasting peace has the strongest support of our Government. We have worked as hard as we could to avoid hostilities and to end them. But the fighting came, and the road forward to real peace and progress will not be easy. Still there is now a real chance for all to turn from the frustrations of the past to the hopes of a peaceful future. While the first responsibility falls to the peoples and governments in the area, we must do our best to that end, both inside and outside the United Nations.

The continuing crisis and the effort to help build a new peace will require the most careful coordination of the work of our Government. To ensure this coordination I am today establishing a Special Committee of the National Security Council. The Secretary of State will preside over this Committee, and its members will be the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and Mr. Walt Rostow. I shall meet with the

Committee from time to time as necessary, and so will the Vice President and the Ambassador to the United Nations.

I have asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to serve as a Special Consultant to the President and to be Executive Secretary of the Committee. Mr. Bundy has worked with us before, and he has been in informal consultation in the last year on a number of subjects. Mr. Bundy has now asked his board of trustees at the Ford Foundation for a temporary leave of absence, and he is already at work. I am asking all agencies of the Government to assist him with such staff support as he may request for the Special Committee. The Committee will meet regularly at the White House.

NOTE: The President made the statement at a morning meeting of the National Security Council in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Later, at 1:37 p.m. a press briefing was held by George E. Christian, Special Assistant to the President, and McGeorge Bundy, President of the Ford Foundation and former Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Following the briefing Mr. Bundy replied to questions concerning his new assignment. The full texts of Mr. Christian's statement and Mr. Bundy's remarks are printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 3, p. 837).

256 Toasts of the President and of President Banda of the Republic of Malawi. June 8, 1967

President Banda, Mr. Vice President, Mr. Secretary of State, distinguished members of the Presidential party, Mr. Justice Douglas, gentlemen:

We are honored today to visit once again with the distinguished President of the Republic of Malawi.

We hope that for President Banda—as for

us—this visit is like a homecoming. Dr. Banda was educated in the United States of America. He has spent a great deal of time here in our country. We are delightfully encouraged that he keeps returning despite the fact that he knows us reasonably well.

Since Dr. Banda's arrival, he and I have

~~TOP SECRET~~

12

8 June 1967

SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BOSTON
MR. BUNDY ✓
MR. SMITH

SUBJECT: Why the USS LIBERTY Was Where It Was

Attachment 1 shows the JRC forecast for June with the approved mission of the USS LIBERTY.

This was changed by a routine submission on 2 June. These are normally noted by Jessup for the White House, McAfee for State, and Chapin for CIA. Being proposed by DOD, it is assumed this had full Pentagon approval, in this case Vance.

Routine changes without specific indications as to number of nautical miles off shore are merely noted and entered in the book.

It is assumed that such a ship will operate under the discretion of COMSIXTH FLEET and USCINCEUR.

It would seem to have been unnecessary at the time to submit this particular track change to the principals at the date submitted.

Let me make myself clear. There is no doubt in my mind that JRC is completely in the clear, having submitted this change in plans in good faith and on a timely basis.

Whether the actual nautical distance of the USS LIBERTY from the UAR coast on 8 June was unwise in view of the hostilities or whether this should be gauged as an accident of war is for others to judge.

[**SANITIZED**]

Peter Jessup

Attachments (4)

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 82-179 1500 appeal

By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 9-14-88

~~TOP SECRET~~

SANITIZED

8 June 1967

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MR. BUNDY ✓
MR. SMIT ✓
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SANITIZED

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SANITIZED

Peter Jessup

Attachments (4)

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 88-07
By lif, NARS, Date 8-22-88

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~~TOP SECRET~~

12

8 June 1967

DECLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BOSTON
MR. BUNDEY ✓
MR. SMITH
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Peter Jessup



Attachments (4)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NLS 82-179 appeal
By ing, N46S, Date 9-24-85

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

6-11-67
71

Thurs., June 8, 1967
5:25 PM

MR. PRESIDENT:

I am not sure you are coming to our 6:30 meeting today, but if you do come, there are two areas of confusion that you could straighten out with a sentence each.

The first area is discussion with foreign diplomats. Both here and in the State Department energetic and entirely loyal officers have been talking with foreign diplomats in terms which go well beyond what either you or the Secretary of State has seen or approved. Sometimes this is speculation on terms of a settlement; sometimes it is speculation on causes and results. I suggest that you may want to set down the rule that all diplomatic contacts are to be the direct authority of the Secretary of State and at his delegation (and you probably will want to indicate that major diplomatic positions will not be developed or hinted except after you have approved them).

A similar problem exists in press contacts as the news reports of the last few days plainly indicate. Here my suggestion is that press guidance in each Department should be the responsibility of a Secretary, and in the White House of the President, and that any routine guidance at a lower level will be handled by the Information Committee of the Select Committee. You may want to add a word of discouragement for those who have been doing this heavy backgrounding in recent days. There are simply too many people doing it and they are backgrounding their own ideas and not those of the USG. This applies in every part of town, as far as I can make out (including the White House and the EOB).

I am sending this over now, and separately I will have a brief agenda paper at 6:30 for your use if you join us.

M. B.
McG. B.

Military
and Policy

77

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

8 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

You have asked what action we are taking to control deliveries of military equipment to Middle Eastern states. The following rules are in effect:

1. No additional materiel can be released for delivery to any Middle Eastern state under either a military assistance program or a Defense Department controlled sale, without the approval of a representative of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

2. Military equipment, previously released for shipment to Arab states which have broken relations with us, is being repossessed to the extent that it remains under our control. Today we are tracing a shipment of 134 radios to Iraq, the only remaining shipment in this category.

Both the Arab states and Israel have purchased directly from manufacturers substantial quantities of ammunition, military vehicles, and military spare parts. The manufacturers apply to the Munitions Control Board for licenses to export such equipment. A number of such licenses are outstanding. The Department of State's policy concerning exports of such arms is as follows:

a. Licenses issued for shipments to Arab states which have broken diplomatic relations with the United States have been suspended. United States Customs is refusing clearance of munitions destined for those countries. (This action has gone as far as unloading shipments to Iraq from a Dutch vessel in New York on June 7.)

b. No new munitions licenses are being approved for shipments to Israel or any Arab nation at war with Israel.

c. Existing approved licenses for munitions shipments to Israel and Arab countries which have not broken relations with the United States have not been suspended.

We anticipate Israel will request assistance in procuring substantial quantities of ammunition, spare parts, and replacement equipment. Any such requests for items under U.S. control will be personally reviewed by Messrs. Vance and Katzenbach, and their recommendations will be submitted for approval to the National Security Council Subcommittee of which you are Executive Secretary.


Robert S. McNamara

June 1, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR TOM JOHNSON

From McGeorge Bundy

I came down on Monday morning for informal consultations as I have done on other subjects before. On Tuesday afternoon the President asked me to do the particular job which was announced at the NSC meeting on Wednesday.

I have two young watch officers working for me, and I have borrowed Mr. Harold Saunders of the NSC staff. This of course is aside from the subcommittees on particular subjects which are manned by officers of the regular departments. I naturally have the closest possible working relations with Mr. Rostow, Mr. Bator and appropriate members of the White House and EOB staffs.

Friday, June 9, 1967, 6:15 p.m.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Subject: The 6:30 Meeting

The main business at the Special Committee meeting tonight will be the tough immediate tactical question of arms and economic shipments to crisis areas. There is a clear division of opinion on the strategy -- most of the professionals in the government would keep existing commitments (except arms) to Arab countries that have not broken relations. Clark Clifford takes a harder view. David Ginsburg, somewhat to my surprise, thinks there is merit in distinguishing between the good and bad Arabs. The detailed facts and figures are quite complex and you may wish to stay out of the meeting and let us give you a clear-cut paper for consideration tonight. Alternatively, you may want to come in between quarter of 7 and 7 and let me summarize the situation after we have had a whack at it. I have asked Francis Bator to come because he has such a good quick grasp of economic facts, and the Secretary of State is bringing his usual group, which is a bit too big for comfort but apparently necessary while we are trying to sort out relations with that bureaucracy.

The other items which are up for discussion are listed in the attached agenda and I think that they can all be handled without your help unless you choose to come.

My conversations with the Secretary make me doubtful that his back-grounder will meet the need you feel before the weekend. But I am more and more persuaded that the only real answer will be a serious public statement. But I think we can and should wait until the actual situation is somewhat clearer. I also think we need time to prepare such a statement. If I had to guess, I think it ought to be from your own mouth and that it should be a calm historic review with basic guidelines and not specific commitments toward the future, and I would hope you might consider doing it about Wednesday of next week unless the situation changes.

The materials that various subcommittees are gathering can be drawn on for your speech on fairly short notice when you are ready. In essence

what it would do is define and describe exactly what we have done since the middle of May -- a most creditable record.

2. Report our own view of what has in fact happened and pin a rose or two on Nasser as a liar and others who have slandered the U. S.

3. Make clear that we have now seen a historical event which necessarily changes the landscape.

4. Project a positive picture of our hope for a strong and secure Israel in a prosperous and stable Middle East.

5. Emphasize that this task is in the first instance a task for the nations in the area. This is good LBJ doctrine and good Israeli doctrine, and therefore a good doctrine to get out in public.

6. Warn of the dangers of a new arms race and express our readiness to join with all in arrangements which will avoid the terrible waste of the arms race of the last ten years. (We are assembling detailed facts and figures on all the Soviets have wasted and all that these races have cost all concerned.) This comment should not be surfaced now but should come after we have begun diplomatic efforts -- perhaps tomorrow -- with the Soviet Union directly.

7. Make clear the U. S. view that this time there must be a peace and not simply a set of fragmentary armistice agreements.

8. Put us on record in favor of a real attack on the refugee problem -- again by the parties concerned.

9. The general effect of such a speech in my judgment should be to show mastery of the factual situation, clarity in the purpose of the U. S., sympathy for the legitimate goals of Israel in a radically new situation, discriminating sympathy for good Arabs as against bad Arabs, and a clear sense of what the role of the U. S. is and is not in this area.

McG. B.

85

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR

NSC SPECIAL COMMITTEE

On the basis of last night's discussion, it seems likely that we will wish to stay with our existing policy statements for the next few days. For the convenience of all departments, I enclose copies of the documents which together constitute our on-the-record position today. They are:

1. The President's statement of May 23.
2. White House statement of June 5.
3. The President's letter to Senator Mansfield of June 8.
4. The Resolution introduced by Ambassador Goldberg on June 8.

McGeorge Bundy
McGeorge Bundy

File McGeorge Bundy

854

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR
NSC SPECIAL COMMITTEE

Enclosed are two documents to be added
to those distributed this morning.

McGeorge Bundy

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(176)

CONFIDENTIAL

(7/2)

Tuesday, June 13, 1967 -- 3:55 p.m.

Mr. President:

E

Minister Eylon asked to see me today to pick up a copy of the talk I gave in Middlebury.

In fact, he raised two matters:

from: Wall Renter

1. The Israeli negotiating position. He said that a month ago there was no serious crisis in the Middle East; 10 days ago they felt they were being throttled; now there is temporary euphoria and relief at the military victory; but they have not had time to think through their position. The job for Israel is, having won the war, now to try to win the peace. He asked if we had any advice? I said he knew our formal positions, notably the President's statement of May 23 and everything else down to the resolution inscribed at the UN Security Council. We are clearly for both territorial integrity in the Middle East and for peace. Our powers to make peace, however, are extremely limited. A major attempt to retrieve the Soviet-radical Arab positions is under way, including apparently a meeting of the General Assembly. A great deal hinges on what kind of a position they take and especially whether it is one that will draw to it the majority in the UN General Assembly and, in the end, moderate Arabs. As the President had made clear in his press conference this morning, we were committed to certain principles in this situation but did not have a program.

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understand

He said that he understood this and, without instructions, he would only say this: It is important that the Arabs find out in the political offensive that the Russians cannot deliver any more effectively than they could deliver militarily. If this political counteroffensive fails, he feels that the Arabs may be willing then to talk. I said, once again, that what happened in the General Assembly and happened with the moderate Arabs depended upon the positions put forward by Israel.

2. He then turned to the notes concerning the LIBERTY. He said that he found no difficulty with our finding the issue "Incomprehensible." He was disturbed by the use of the word "wanton"; and he would have wished that we had recognized how promptly the Israeli government had informed us of the error. He said Golda Meir had been with Rabin when he was informed; that considerable soldier "almost fainted" at the news of the attack; He was greatly disturbed by the NEWSWEEK item in Periscope. Without in any way going around his Ambassador or the State Department, it was his personal suggestion that both notes might be amended or dropped and the "tone of the exchange lowered." He repeated that he saw nothing wrong at all in our asking how it could have happened; who did it; and our requesting that the Israeli government do something about it. The implication of purposeful action, however, he

OFILMED
/S: CMS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

(176)

CONFIDENTIAL

Tuesday, June 13, 1967 -- 3:55 p.m.


Mr. President:

Minister Evron asked to see me today to pick up a copy of the talk I gave in Middlebury.

In fact, he raised two matters:

from: Wall Street

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15
POL 27 ARAB-ISR

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OFFILMED
/S: CMS

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

felt was most unfortunate.

He said that although final confirmation had not come to Washington, it was his understanding that those involved in the attack were about to be severely punished.

I explained to him that there was a good deal of strong Congressional feeling about the matter. In addition, the President and the military were understandably concerned. The language of the note was precise. We found the incident literally "incomprehensible." He said the Court of Inquiry was working as fast as it could. Perhaps when we had conducted our investigation, we could close out the incident with some kind of joint statement.

I noted and said I would pass along his thoughts.

Walt Rostow

cc: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach ✓

CONFIDENTIAL 10 F 145 A1 125 14 51 1 01

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
POLICY PLANNING COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

June 14, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Middle Eastern Crisis

I enclose some thoughts on the US posture in the Middle East crisis, in the light of probable Soviet tactics.

ZB.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attachment:
Memo dated June 14
on Middle East

~~SECRET~~ ATTACHMENT

*Part was
position
setback*

109



MEMORANDUM -

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Mr. Kostsov

89

App I

Thursday, June 15, 1967

5:15 PM

Mr. President:

I attach the agenda for tonight's 6:30 meeting.

Item 1 is the draft UN speech, which can be handled separately. I would be glad to have your instructions as to whether you want it discussed at the meeting. I can play it either way you want. A first rough draft is attached.

Item 2 on the control of the arms race does not require immediate decision by you tonight.

I think the other items are of sufficient interest and urgency to require your participation if you can make it. Item 3 is about Wheelus Base, which the Libyans have asked us to leave, and Item 4 is about messages to moderate Arab leaders, which I think you will want to rule on yourself.

McG. B.
McG. B.

June 17 67

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MC GEORGE BUNDY

94

SUBJECT: SMALL AID PACKAGES TO MOROCCO AND TUNISIA

STATE, AID AND I JOIN IN RECOMMENDING FINAL ACTION ON TWO SMALL PACKAGES THAT WERE READY FOR SIGNING JUST BEFORE THE CRISES. ONE IS 6 MILLION FOR ELECTRIFICATION IN TUNISIA AND ONE IS 3 MILLION FOR CIVIL AIR CONSTRUCTION IN MOROCCO. BOTH HAVE BEEN FULLY CLEARED TODAY BY HARRIMAN AND MACOMBER WITH MANSFIELD, DIRKSEN, FULLBRIGHT, AND MORGAN. ALL AGREE THAT THESE SMALL ACTIONS WILL HELP A LOT WITH TWO GOOD MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS.

THESE ACTIONS ARE NOT FORMALLY ^{PROHIBITED} PROHIBITED BY THE RULES LAID DOWN LAST WEEK, BUT I HAVE TOLD STATE AND AID THAT ANY ACTIONS IN THIS AREA SHOULD HAVE YOUR APPROVAL. THEY WOULD LIKE TO ACT QUICKLY WHILE THE ARABS MEET IN KUWAIT.

CAN THEY GO AHEAD NOW?

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1967

Special
Comm
95
Pia
App F

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Removal of Travel Restrictions for Israel, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia

I join in the State Department's recommendation that travel restrictions be removed now on the above-named countries. There is no current danger to Americans in any of them, and the gesture will be welcomed both by travellers and by the governments concerned, all of which can use gestures from us right now.

The bureau level argument is presented in the attached internal State Department memorandum. Some of the argumentation is a bit bureaucratic, but the points of substance I think are well taken.

I agree with you that the public noise level is not high, but the private comments from both governments and travellers are increasingly urgent, and I think we will do better to act before there is much public protest than after.

The only serious objection to this move that I can see is the problem of danger to individuals, and I share the judgment of both State and CIA that this danger simply is not serious in the countries listed.

(One of the very remarkable facts of the last two weeks is that no American lives have yet been lost due to any wild Arab actions,) even in wilder countries than these - except *conspicuous in battle lines.*
Go ahead

Wait

*See Treasury memo from Fowler
Let's investigate his background
M.F.B.
McG. B.*

C

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 17, 1967

FS 96a

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Go ahead

Wait

See Treasury memo from Jordan
Let's investigate his suggestions
m.l.B.
McG. B.

C

Mr. Bundy

Mr. Ginsburg asked me to stress that the existence of this memo is a strictly personal matter between you and him.

DAVID GINSB 3
1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

TELEPHONE
(202) 223-3800

111a

Mac,

I spoke with the
VP and he asked for a
memo. Let me know
if there's anything in it
seriously anyway.

D.G. 6/17/67,

20

DAVID GINSBURG
MYER FELDMAN
TYL BELL
ALVIN FRIEDMAN
ROBERT M. HAUSMAN
LEE R. MARKS
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LAW OFFICES
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1700 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N. W.
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June 17, 1967

TELEPHONE
(202) 223-3800
CABLE ADDRESS
"LEGIS"

Settlement

111b

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

Subject: Middle East Situation

1. You're familiar, I know, with thinking and developments here. What may be most helpful is to describe, so far as I know it, the thinking and the concerns on the Israeli side. All this, of course, goes into Mac Bundy's computer.

2. All interested parties should be able to live with the Security Council resolution tabled by Arthur G. on June 8. There is growing concern on the Israeli side that the platoon of American Ambassadors returning from the Arab States, and other Arab experts already here or en route, will somehow manage to erode this position but I suppose there are enough on guard to prevent serious trouble. The Israelis share Arthur's view that the Soviet proposal, which presumably will come before the General Assembly, would be "a step backward towards another war" and that what the area needs is not "just a fragile, perilous armistice which is what we have had for 18 years, not just a withdrawal which is necessary but insufficient, but real peace." The President and A.G. have both pointed the correct road: discussions between the parties or, at the very least, modalities to peace which include, in a central way, discussions between the parties.

3. Events have moved so rapidly that it's likely no interested government has completed an examination of results and consequences. The Israelis have made some progress in clarifying their thinking, but they are still at work. What follows is a summary of what I think the Israelis are putting before the State Department:

a. A new situation exists and no rational purpose is served by seeking to reconstruct the old. The Israelis want peace and security, but these objectives have territorial implications. They have not completed their study of the juridical, territorial and demographic consequences but, to them, it is already

certain that it will be easier to create a new structure than to remodel the old.

b. An armistice agreement is inconceivable. The Arab States and Israel must find a new basis for settlement. On this issue the Israelis are clear and their views fixed; they cannot contemplate a fourth war for existence.

c. Israel and the Arab States must move forward from the cease fire to a permanent peace settlement. That settlement must ensure international interests and determine the borders and interstate relations in the area; it must emerge from the parties and must not be dictated by outside interests. Non-recognition is the source of the problem; direct talks are the only route to a solution. The Israelis offer no procedural blueprint; they hold a deep conviction that only direct contact of the sort they had in 1949 can produce results. The efforts of the Palestine Conciliation Commission proved fruitless; the two sides never met.

d. The immediate objective is to frustrate the Soviet proposal for return to the general armistice agreement lines. The hard core fact is that no Israeli Government in sight could carry out such a resolution even if it were isolated.

4. What follows now is a topical outline - unhappily, not very informative - of reaction to the more obvious issues:

a. Egypt

- (i) How can the two countries live together?
- (ii) How ensure the absence of belligerence in Suez and Elath?
- (iii) How ensure that Sinai cannot again be used as a base for attacks on Israel?
- (iv) What will be the future of the Gaza Strip (which was never Egyptian)?

b. Syria

The problem here relates only to the heights and the threats represented by existing borders to

- (i) security, and
- (ii) water (sources of the Jordan River subject to Syrian domination).

c. West Bank

Is it necessary or desirable to reunite the two banks of the Jordan River? Do the people on the West Bank regard their future as tied up with the East Bank? Israeli position, as yet, undefined.

d. Jerusalem

It is inconceivable to the Israelis that the city will be divided again. The Israelis have already acknowledged that they must guarantee international religious and spiritual interests -- which means free access to all religious places. They believe this can be provided in a united Jerusalem more effectively than in a divided city.

5. All these questions have territorial implications and the Israelis need time to clarify the issues before even attempting to discuss them with the Arab States. The Israeli request to the United States is for time within which to work out a durable and viable settlement. Success of the Soviet effort at the Assembly would be disastrous; the Soviet resolution or a compromise with it would give a new lease on life to Russian and Nasser influence in the area.

The Israelis do not seem to be unnerved by the Soviet thrust in the Assembly. They regard it as a Soviet ploy to recoup lost ground; they see Kosygin's trip as evidence of this. Their argument is that Russia is responsible for the present situation and believe that the Russian moves are signs of weakness not strength. The Israelis are in the midst of political campaign of their own to expose Russian policy and demonstrate that Russia is directly responsible for what has happened.

The Israelis feel that, looking back on 1957, the fact that they stood alone for four months did produce ten years of stability. It led to free passage in the Straits and practical

June 17, 1967

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demilitarization of Sinai and the Gaza Strip borders. That settlement was destroyed by Nasser. A permanent settlement is now needed; a new settlement map must evolve from direct negotiations; there is no room for palliatives, new or old. Time is needed, not days but weeks or months. It was not the Israelis who destroyed the modicum of stability that existed before; it was Egypt and Jordan. The Israelis cannot go beyond this in public; they - and we -- need time to bring the point home.

Finally, the Israelis believe that the Arabs, too, are under the pressure of events and facts. If the political line is held, unlike 1957, the future will press harder on the Arab States than on Western interests or Israel.

6. None of this takes specific account of our own security and economic interests in the Middle East. Nor does it deal explicitly with the interests of our allies, particularly Britain, in continuing to obtain Middle East oil and to serve as bankers to Middle East oil interests. Nor does it deal at all with safeguarding the security and economic interests of the Arab States, individually or collectively. The State Department -- with Mac B., the White House and Defense -- must be at work on these questions. Based on the experience of the last 20 years, the Israelis are conditioned to believe that the State Department will conclude that these interests are so divergent that vital Israeli interests must be sacrificed. Their response may be Pavlovian but history, from their viewpoint, is too fresh to be ignored. [Here I'll add a word of my own: what was done particularly in 1956 and 1957 but since then as well, from the viewpoint of U.S. interests alone, was appalling. I, therefore, tend to share Israeli fears that between the United States and Israel there is danger of stormy diplomatic weather.]

7. Attached is a memorandum by a man named Nadav Safran, an Egyptian Jew who came here 18 years ago and now teaches at Harvard. The Israelis are especially considering Part II.

8. There is no need to extrapolate political consequences. What the Administration is saying and doing now is being watched carefully not only by the Jewish community, but by others who should be and have been close to the Administration and whose support - and advice - we need, have had, and should have again. Feelings of pride and relief are now running so fast and deep

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-5-

that even the customary sources of leadership and opinion formation in the Jewish community have considerably less relevance than ever before. We're faced with feelings, now, not facts or judgments. What I'm saying is that this is a time either to say little or to speak plain.

D.G.
D.G.

Attachment

June 20, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW
MR. BUNDY

✓
Sent to
you at lunch.

Mr. Evron wants you to know immediately that the following announcement will be made in Tel Aviv about 2 p. m. EDT:

"The Court of Inquiry nominated by the Chief of the General Staff in consequence of the regrettable and tragic incident with the U. S. S. Liberty has presented its report which was transmitted to the Military Advocate General. After examining the evidence the latter has decided on the holding of a preliminary justice inquiry by a military legally qualified judge who is empowered by law to decide on the committal for trial of any person. The President of the Appeals Court Martial has nominated one of the legally qualified judges of the Appeals Court Martial to hold the inquiry."

Although it will not be part of the announcement, Evron also passed along the following background information:

"The name of the Judge is Lt. Col. Isaiah Yerushalmi. He will begin his inquiry tomorrow."

Harold H. Saunders

* * *

Bundy Has Mission Of Peace

By DON OBERDORFER
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON The U.S. sought to move beyond Middle East battlefields Wednesday to the knotty problem of a lasting peace.

President Johnson named aide McGeorge Bundy his "special consultant" on a Middle East settlement, and executive director of a top-former White House security level government committee.

"The road to real peace and progress will not be easy," said Johnson in a cautious understatement of the massive task ahead.

Some informed officials here are saying that a cease-fire on the battlefield -- as complicated to adhere as that seems to be -- is child's play compared to the task of achieving an acceptable and permanent solution of the broader struggle between the Arabs and the Jews.

It is this task of attempting to reconcile the seemingly irreconcilable which Bundy and his associates have undertaken.

The new "special committee" will be headed by Secretary of State Dean Rusk. It includes Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler, Army Gen. Earle Wheeler, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard Helms, director of the CIA, Walt W. Rostow, the President's special assistant for national security, and Clark Clifford, chairman of the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

The President said he plans to meet personally with the committee from time to time, as will Vice President Humphrey and U.N. Ambassador

MIAMI

HERALD

7/8 JUN 67

The U.S. apparently looks on Israel's spectacular military successes as a possible opportunity to break, once and for all, the 10-year impasse in the Middle East.

"There is now a real chance for all to turn from the frustrations of the past to the hopes of a peaceful future," Johnson said.

But the situation also presents enormous difficulties as

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